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As reports last night of a draft Withdrawal Agreement with the EU 
emerged, we finally managed to get our hands on a copy by about 
7.30pm. What followed was several hours of “digesting” the key points 
of this Agreement, along with a flurry of associated media interviews 
this morning (listen to David’s interviews with BBC Five Live and BBC 
Scotland here and Alex’s interview with BBC WM). 
In essence, what has emerged is largely that which was anticipated in 
the build-up over the last couple of weeks; that the UK would pay a 
divorce bill of some £39 billion, that the mutual rights of UK and EU 
citizens would be upheld in their respective countries of residence, 
and that there would be a “backstop” to prevent the emergence of a 
“hard border” in Northern Ireland, should a new “Deal” not be in place 
upon the expiry of the transition period status quo ante transition 
period (which, according to the agreement, will start after we formally 
leave the EU at 11pm on March 29th next year and run until at least 
31st December 2020). 
In this sense, we should stipulate that this is a Withdrawal Agreement, 
not a new Economic Relationship. However, what is notable here is 
the concessions that appear to have been extracted on both sides to 
prevent a hard border in NI.  The EU appear to have made a 
concession to the UK by allowing the entire UK to remain in a 
“temporary” Customs Union (excluding fishing) after the expiry of the 
transition period in December 2020, (although both parties could seek 
to “extend” the transition period – all the way to the year “20XX”!) so 
as to prevent the erection of new customs barriers between NI and 
the rest of the UK. The NI backstop arrangement could only be 
terminated through “joint agreement” on a “joint committee”. 
In addition, large parts of the Northern Irish economy will remain in 
regulatory alignment with the EU (i.e., in effect partially remaining in 
the Single Market, particularly relating to sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations) for however long the backstop lasts. The EU has also 
insisted that the UK must maintain regulatory alignment (i.e., a “level 
playing field”) with the EU in areas such as environmental standards, 
competition policy and labour laws, so as to prevent the UK trying to 
undercut the EU during this period. These take the form of “non-
regression” clauses to prevent the UK from weakening its standards in 
these areas. 
As such, the UK will continue to be subject to jurisdiction by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for the duration of the 
transition period, and for up to four years after the expiry of a 
transition period for any disputes arising during the transition. In 
addition, the EU have insisted that provisions regarding UK 
Government “state aid” to industry be subject to EU oversight for as 
long as the Northern Irish backstop is in place. The UK Government 
will be “consulted” on various matters pertaining to the adoption of 
new EU Directives during this period. 
In short, we could sum up the above under the premise of “pay, obey 
and no say”, at least for the duration of the transition period (and, in 
many regards, the Agreement binds aspects UK policy as long as the 
backstop continues to apply) 
Of course, as a Draft Agreement, it still needs to be approved in the 
UK Parliament, approved by a Qualified Majority Vote in the European 
Council (that arm of the EU consisting of representatives of the other 
27 member states) and approved by the European Parliament. As 
such, given the vocal opposition already expressed by Tory Brexiters 
such as Jacob Rees-Mogg and Boris Johnson, the Labour Party, the 
DUP, the SNP and others, its passage through the House of 
Commons is far from guaranteed. Theresa May addressed Commons 
today and next month will see a Parliamentary vote on the Withdrawal 
Agreement. 
If the Agreement is approved by all, we will then enter a transition 
period whereby a new trade deal will start to be negotiated on. This 
however, could take years, and in the interim the UK will remain, at 
least partly within the regulatory orbit of the EU (presumably it is the 
“non-regression” clauses rather than the transition that have led some 
to use the term a “vassal state”). 
At this point it is worth reflecting on the statements made by key 
Brexiteers back in 2016: David Davis stating that the UK would get a 
deal with the EU that gave “the exact same benefits”; Liam Fox stating 
that a new trade deal with the EU would be “one of the easiest in 
history” and Michael Gove purporting that the UK held “most of the 
cards”[1].  The Draft Agreement released last night very much looks a 
far cry from these claims. 
Moreover, there appears to be no quick end to the process of leaving 
the EU, and certainly no quick negotiating of a new deal, should the 
draft Agreement be adopted. The “Brexistentialist Dilemma” will 
continue to plague us for a long time to come. As such, it should come 
as little surprise that this morning has seen a flurry of ministerial 
resignations (with both the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, 
Dominic Raab, and Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Esther 
McVey, having resigned at the time of writing). 
Reference 
Draft Withdrawal Agreement: downloaded 
from  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/756374/14_November_Draft_Agree
ment_on_the_Withdrawal_of_the_United_Kingdom_of_Great_Britain_
and_Northern_Ireland_from_the_European_Union.pdf 
[1] https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/14/theresa-
may-brexit-deal-solves-nothing-polly-toynbee 
 
